We extend the analysis of [26] to handling more general utility functions: linear substitution functions, which include the Leontief utility. We show that the problem reduces to the general analytic center model discussed in [26] . Thus, the same complexity bound applies to approximating the Fisher equilibrium problem with linear substitution utilities.
Introduction
Consider the Fisher exchange market problem where players are divided into two sets: producer and consumer; see Brainard and Scarf [2, 22] . Consumers have money to buy goods and maximize their individual utility functions; producers sell their goods for money. The price equilibrium is an assignment of prices to goods so that when every consumer buys a maximal bundle of goods then the market clears, meaning that all the money is spent and all the goods are sold.
Eisenberg and Gale [10, 13] gave a convex optimization setting to formulate Fisher's problem with linear utilities. They constructed an aggregated concave objective function that is maximized at the equilibrium. Thus, finding an equilibrium became solving a convex optimization problem, and it could be obtained by using the Ellipsoid method or interiorpoint algorithms in polynomial time. Here, polynomial time means that one can compute an -approximate equilibrium in a number of arithmetic operations bounded by polynomial in n and log ); see [26] . Moreover, if the input data are rational, then an exact solution can be obtained by solving a system of linear equations and inequalities when
, where L is the bit length of the input data. Thus, the arithmetic operation bound becomes O(n 4 L), which is in line with the best complexity bound for linear programming of the same dimension and size.
In this note, we extend the analysis of [26] to handling more general utility functions: linear substitution functions, which include the Leontief utility. We show that the problem reduces to the same general analytic center model discussed in [26] . Thus, the same complexity bound applies to approximating the Fisher problem with linear substitution utilities.
More importantly, we apply a theorem on the model in [26] to show that the solution to an Arrow-Debreu problem with Leontief's utilities, a more difficult exchange market problem, is the Perron-Frobenius eigen-vector to a scaled Leontief utility matrix, and the equilibrium vector is a solution to a system of linear equations and inequalities of the original data.
Therefore, if all input data are rational, then there always exists a rational Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, that is, the entries of the equilibrium vector are rational numbers; and the size (bit-length) of the solution vector is bounded by the size of the data.
The Fisher equilibrium problem
Without loss of generality, assume that there is 1 unit good from each producer j ∈ P with |P | = n. Let consumer i ∈ C (with |C| = m) has an initial endowment w i to spend and buy goods to maximize his or her individual linear substitution utility:
where
is a linear function in x ij -the amount of good bought from producer j by consumer i. More precisely,
In particular, the Leontief utility function is the one with
is an all zero vector except for the kth entry that equals 1/a ik .
Through out this note, we make the following assumptions: This is to say that every consumer in the market has money to spend and he or she likes at least one good; and every good is valued by at least one consumer. We will see that, with these assumptions, each consumer can have a positive utility value at equilibria. If a consumer has zero budget or his or her utility has zero value for every good, then buying nothing is an optimal solution for him or her so that he or she can be removed from the market; if a good has zero value to every consumer, then it is a "free" good with zero price in a price equilibrium and can be arbitrarily distributed among the consumers so that it can be removed from the market too.
For given prices p j on good j, consumer i's maximization problem is
Let x * i denote a maximal solution vector of (2). Then, vector p is called a Fisher price equilibrium if there is x * i for each consumer such that i∈C
where e is the vector of all ones representing available goods on the exchange market.
Problem (2) can be rewritten as an linear program, after introducing a scalar variable
Besides (u i , x i ) being feasible, the optimality conditions of (3) are
It has been shown by Eisenberg and Gale [10, 9, 13] (independently later by Codenotti et al. [3] ) that a Fisher price equilibrium is an optimal Largrange multiplier vector of an aggregated convex optimization problem:
Conversely, an optimal Largrange multiplier vector is also a Fisher price equilibrium, which can be seen from the optimality conditions of (5):
for some p j , the Largarange multiplier of equality constraint of j ∈ P , and some π k i ≥ 0, the Largarange multiplier of inequality constraint of i ∈ C and k. Summing the second constraint over k we have
then summing the third constraint over j we have
This implies that x i from the aggregate problem is feasible for (3). Moreover, note that π
. Thus, finding a Fisher price equilibrium is equivalent to finding an optimal Largrange multiplier of (5).
In particular, if each u k i (x i ) has the Leontief utility form, i.e.,
for a given a ik > 0. Then, upon using u i to replace variable x ij , the aggregated convex optimization problem can be simplified to
where the Leontief matrix
Therefore, the jth entry of A T u is the total amount of good j purchased by all m consumers, and a Fisher equilibrium is an optimal Largrange multiplier vector of the simplified problem.
, then the equilibrium price of the jth good will be 0.
The weighted analytic center problem
In [26] the Eisenberg-Gale aggregated problem was related to the (linear) analytic center problem studied in interior-point algorithms
subject to Ax = b,
where the given A is an m × n-dimensional matrix with full row rank, b is an m-dimensional vector, and w j is the nonnegative weight on the jth variable. Any x who satisfies the constraints is called a primal feasible solution, while any optimal solution to the problem is called a weighted analytic center.
If the weighted analytic center problem has an optimal solution, the optimality condi-
where y and s are the Largrange or KKT multipliers or dual variable and slacks of the dual linear program:
and S is the diagonal matrix with slack vector s on its diagonals.
Let the feasible set of (9) be bounded and has a (relative) interior, i.e., has a strictly feasible point x > 0 with Ax = b (clearly holds for problem (5) and (7)). Then, there is a strictly feasible dual solution s > 0 with s = A T y for some y. Furthermore, [26] , based on the literature of interior-point algorithms (e.g., Megiddo and Kojima et al. [19, 18] and
Güler [14] ), has shown that Theorem 1. Let A, b be fixed and consider a solution (x(w), y(w), s(w)) of (10) as a mapping of w ≥ 0 with j w j = 1. Then,
y} is one-to-one, continuously and differentiable.
• The mapping of
• The pair (x j (w), s j (w)) is unique for any j ∈ W = {j : w j > 0}, and
and for any two solutions (x (w), y (w), s (w)) and (x (w), y (w), s (w)) of (10) .
From this theorem, we see that, in the Fisher equilibrium problem (5) or (7), u i (w), the utility value of each consumer, is unique; but the price vector p(w) can be non-unique.
In addition, a modified primal-dual path-following algorithm was developed in [26] , for computing an -solution for any > 0: 
The Arrow-Debreu equilibrium problem
The Arrow-Debreu exchange market equilibrium problem which was first formulated by Leon Walras in 1874 [24] . In this problem everyone in a population of m players has an initial endowment of a divisible good and a utility function for consuming all goods-their own and others. Every player sells the entire initial endowment and then uses the revenue to buy a bundle of goods such that his or her utility function is maximized. Walras asked whether prices could be set for everyone's good such that this is possible. An answer was given by
Arrow and Debreu in 1954 [1] who showed that such equilibrium would exist if the utility functions were concave.
We consider a special class of Arrow-Debreu's problems, where each of the m = n players have exactly one unit of a divisible good for trade (e.g., see [15, 26] ), and let player i, i = 1, ..., m, bring good j = i and have the linear substitution utility function of (1).
We call this class of problems the pairing class. The main difference between Fisher's and Arrow-Debreu' models is that, in the latter, each player is both producer and consumer and the initial endowment w i of player i is not given and will be the price assigned to his or her good i. Nevertheless, we can still write a (parametric) convex optimization model
where we wish to select weights w i 's such that an optimal Largrange multiplier vector p equals w. It is easily seen that any optimal Largrange multiplier vector p satisfies
For fixed u k ij , consider p be a map from w. Then, the mapping is from S n + to S n + , and the mapping is upper semi-continuous from Theorem 1. Thus, there is a w ∈ S n + such that an Largrange multiplier vector p(w) = w from the Kakutani fixed-point theorem (see, e.g., [22, 23, 25] ). This may be seen as an alternative, restricted to the case of the linear substitution utility functions, to Arrow-Debreu's general proof of the existence of equilibria.
We now focus on the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium with the (complete) Leontief utility function:
for a given a ik > 0. The parametric convex optimization model becomes
where the Leontief matrix A of (8) is a m × m positive matrix or each entry of A is positive.
Let p ∈ R m be an optimal Largrange multiplier vector of the constraints. Then, we have
Thus, the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is a p ∈ R m , together with u ∈ R m , satisfy
In the matrix form, they become
where U and P are diagonal matrices whose diagonal entries are u and p, respectively. The Arrow-Debreu theorem implies that nonzero p and u exist for this system of equalities and inequalities, even in general case where A ≥ 0, that is, some a ik = 0 in the Leontief matrix. To prove the rationality, we see that there is a rational vector u B to the linear system, so that matrix U B A BB will be rational, so that there will be a rational solution p B to the linear system
Characterization of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
The size result is due to that the sizes of these two linear systems are bounded by the size of A. The rationality result is interesting since the existence of a rational equilibrium is not true for Leontief's utility in Fisher's setting with rational data, see the following example, with three consumers and three goods, adapted from Codenotti et al. [3] and Eaves [11] .
Note that goods 2 and 3 have identical coefficients from each of the three consumers.
Let the initial endowments of three consumers be w 1 = w 2 = w 3 = 1 in Fisher's setting.
Then, the maximal utility values of the three consumers are
the Fisher equalibrium price for good 1 is . Now what to do if two players bring the same type of good? In our present pairing class, they are being treated as two different goods. However, one can set the same utility coefficients to them so that they receive an identical appreciation from all the players (as illustrated in the example). Again, the problem reduces to the pairing class, which leads to rationality. The problem is that these two "same" goods may receive two different prices; for example, one is priced higher and the other is at a discount level. I guess this could happen in the real world since two "same" goods may not be really the same and the market has "freedom" to price. Another open question: is there a polynomial-time algorithm to solve the pairing class of Arrow-Debreu's problems?
